Vision-language models (VLMs) have achieved significant strides in recent times specially in multimodal tasks, yet they remain susceptible to adversarial attacks on their vision components. To address this, we propose Sim-CLIP, an unsupervised adversarial fine-tuning method that enhances the robustness of the widely-used CLIP vision encoder against such attacks while maintaining semantic richness and specificity. By employing a Siamese architecture with cosine similarity loss, Sim-CLIP learns semantically meaningful and attack-resilient visual representations without requiring large batch sizes or momentum encoders. Our results demonstrate that VLMs enhanced with Sim-CLIP's fine-tuned CLIP encoder exhibit significantly enhanced robustness against adversarial attacks, while preserving semantic meaning of the perturbed images. Notably, Sim-CLIP does not require additional training or fine-tuning of the VLM itself; replacing the original vision encoder with our fine-tuned Sim-CLIP suffices to provide robustness. This work underscores the significance of reinforcing foundational models like CLIP to safeguard the reliability of downstream VLM applications, paving the way for more secure and effective multimodal systems.

Multi-modal foundation models like OpenFlamingo, LLaVA, and GPT-4 are increasingly used for various real-world tasks. Prior work has shown that these models are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks on the vision modality. These attacks can be leveraged to spread fake information or defraud users, and thus pose a significant risk, which makes the robustness of large multi-modal foundation models a pressing problem. The CLIP model, or one of its variants, is used as a frozen vision encoder in many vision-language models (VLMs), e.g. LLaVA and OpenFlamingo. We propose an unsupervised adversarial fine-tuning scheme to obtain a robust CLIP vision encoder, which yields robustness on all vision down-stream tasks (VLMs, zero-shot classification) that rely on CLIP. In particular, we show that stealth-attacks on users of VLMs by a malicious third party providing manipulated images are no longer possible once one replaces the original CLIP model with our robust one. No retraining or fine-tuning of the VLM is required. The code and robust models are available at https://github.com/chs20/RobustVLM